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ABSTRACT 
The object of this paper is to analysis the law relating to cadaveric organ 
transplantation in New Zealand. The discussion involves a consideration 
of the common law and s 3 of the Human Tissue Act 1964. The paper 
concludes that s 3 is need of reform in order that the supply of organs 
might be increased. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography 
and annexures) comprises 13,418 words. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The prospect of transplanting body parts is recorded in the book of 
Genesis: 1 
So the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon the man, and while 
he slept took one of his ribs and closed up its place with flesh; and 
the rib which the Lord God had taken from the man he made into a 
woman ... 
However it wasn't until the twentieth century that organ transplantation 
became medically feasible. During the first world war, the transfusion of 
blood became common place. In the late 1920's skin grafts began and 
by the 1940's corneal transplants had become routine. In the 1950's
2 
the transplantation of non-regenerating organs began. The 
transplantation of kidneys was largely routine by December 1967 when 
Doctor Christian Barnaad performed the first heart transplant. The next 
major development for transplantation surgery was the development of 
cyclosporin (an immunosuppressant) in 1983. The drug greatly 
extended the life expectancy of transplant patients because it was able 
to forestall the transplant patient's rejection of the new organ, without 
damaging the patient's immune system. The drug has shortened 
hospital stays and made organ transplants an option for high risk 
patients. As transplantation has moved from being experimental to 
routine, the once unanswered technical questions have now been 
replaced by those of an ethical and legal nature. The success of 
1 The Holy Bible (Revised Standard Version , Eyre and Spottiswoode Limited , London, 
1952) Genesis 2:21 ,22 
21n 1951 Doctor David Hume performed the first non-regenerative vital organ (kidney) 
transplant in Boston. Doctor Hume used a cadaver donor; the transplantation was 
unsuccessful insofar as the recipient died. For a brief history of transplantation see 
David Lamb Organ Transplants and Ethics (Routledge, London, 1990) pp 7-23 
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transplantation surgery has led to a worldwide shortage of organs. In 
March 1996 there were 200 patients on the New Zealand kidney 
transplant waiting list. Approximately 80-100 can expect to receive a 
transplant in the next 12 months. Of the kidneys transplanted 75% 
come from cadavers, the balance are removed from live donors.3 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the law governing organ 
transplantations from cadavers in New Zealand. The discussion involves 
consideration of the common law and s 3 of the Human Tissue Act 1964 
(the Act) which provides for the removal of organs from cadavers. With 
this in mind, the paper is divided into the following principal parts: 
(a) The Common law, 
(b) An analysis of s 3 of the Act, 
(c) Non-compliance with s 3, 
(d) The policy of s 3, 
(e) Reform of s 3, 
(f) Other reform options 
It will be concluded that the language of s 3 of the Act is unclear. Where 
the lack of clarity cannot be attributed to poor drafting it can be 
explained with reference to the confused policy reasons for the section 
and the fact that developments in medical technology have overtaken its 
usefulness. The lack of clarity when coupled with the legislative intent 
to afford generous rights to relatives to object to transplantation has the 
effect of reducing the available number of organs for donation. 
After a survey of different policy approaches to cadaveric organ retrieval 
3This information was provided by the National Kidney Foundation of New Zealand, PO 
Box 11141, Manners Street, Wellington. The Ministry of Health fixes the figure at 85% 
rather than 75%, see The Ministry of Health Tertiary Services Review Committee Renal 
Replacement Services Issues Paper No. 3 (Ministry of Health, Wellington , May 1995) 
13 
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it is concluded that the only practical and workable solution to the 
problems with s 3 is to change from the current system (that 
emphasises the relatives ' rights to the body) to a system that favours the 
retrieval of organs for the benefit of a sick patient . 
II THE COMMON LAW 
Given the relatively recent development of transplant surgery it is , 
perhaps, not surprising that the common law provides little assistance 
in the area of cadaveric transplants. Essentially, this is because the 
common law does not recognise proprietorial rights in a corpse . In R 
v Price4, Stephen J noted the facts in R v Lynrf (the disinterring 
and removal of a body) and said: "[T]he act done would have been a 
peculiarly indecent theft if it had not been for the technical reason that 
a dead body is not the subject of property .116 
Pahl7 notes the doubtful origins of the "no property in a corpse" rule as 
being founded on a wrong analysis of Haynes case6 • The analysis 
incorrectly interprets a passage of the judgment that says a corpse 
cannot own property, to mean that a corpse was not, itself, property. 
It follows that if a corpse cannot, ordinarily,9 be the subject of ownership 
a person cannot, by Will, determine what is to be done to his or her 
4(1884) 12 QBD 247 
5(1788) 2 TR 733 & 100 ER 395 
6Above n 4, 252. See also Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch D 659 
7Susan Pahl "Whose Body is tt Anyway?" [1992] NZLJ 427,428 
6(1614) 12 Co Rep 113 and above n 5, 428 
9This is not the case where the corpse acquires attributes sufficient to justify tts 
preservation on scienrnic or other grounds: Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 C.L.R 406 
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body after death. Although the common law was not prepared to 
recognise a property right in a cadaver it did establish a right to custody 
and possession of the corpse. This can be traced to the eighteenth 
century when the Courts recognised the public interest in the prompt 
burial of corpses. Principles were developed that obliged various 
classes of people in possession of the corpse to bury it. As Pahl 
notes:10 
There developed a right or duty to bury the deceased governed by a 
pecking order with the executors of the deceased at the top of the 
order followed by the w~e and other relatives of the deceased, in turn 
followed by the householder in whose house the deceased died or 
where is or her body lay. 
There is no authority to suggest that the right to possession of a 
cadaver, for burial purposes, can be extended to authorise the removal 
of tissue for transplantation purposes.11 
In summary, the common law was concerned (due to public interest 
considerations) with imposing duties on others to bury a corpse rather 
than creating rights and powers over and in a corpse. The undeveloped 
state of the common law and the rapid development of new uses for 
once worthless body parts has led to the enactment of statutes 
regulating post-mortem examinations, anatomical examinations and the 
transplantation of organs. 
10Above n 7, 429. See also Gerald Dworkin "The Law Relating to Organ 
Transplantation in England" (1970) 3 MLR 353 
11Australian Law Reform Commission Human Tissue Transplant Report - No 7 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1977) 26 
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Ill SECTION 3 (1) OF THE ACT 
On 9 September 1964 the Human Tissue Bill was read for the second 
time. The Honourable Mable B Howard remarked: 12 
I wish he [the Honourable D N Mackay - Minister of Health] had found 
a different name tor the Bill, it is awfully gruesome. Surely he could 
have found a slightly better name than this. However, I suppose a 
rose by any other name smells just as sweet .... 
Despite the disagreement over the name, the Bill was read unopposed. 
Section 3 of the Act closely follows the Human Tissue Act 1961 (UK) (the 
UK Act). Section 3(1) of the Act states: 13 
Removal of human tissue for therapeutic purposes, etc. - (1) If any 
person, either in writing at any time or orally in the presence of 2 or 
more witnesses during his last illness, has expressed a request that 
his body or any specified part of his body be used after his death for 
therapeutic purposes or for purposes of medical education or 
research, the person lawfully in possession of his body after his death 
may, unless he has reason to believe that the request was 
subsequently withdrawn, authorise the removal from the body of any 
part, or as the case may be, the specified part , for use in accordance 
with the request . 
1 (A) Where a record of a request in writing to which subsection (1) of 
this section applies is held on a health computer system, the person 
lawfully in possession of the body of the person who made the 
request may, in reliance on the record , unless that person has reason 
to believe that the request was subsequently withdrawn, authorise the 
removal from the body of any part or (as the case may be) the 
specified part for use in accordance with that request. 
12(1964) 339 NZPD 2013 and 2014 
13Sections 4 and 4A regulate post-mortem examinations and ss 5-9 (inclusive) provide 
for the conduct of anatomical examinations 
9 
In summary, it is necessary to show that the deceased requested in 
writing to donate tissue, or requested, in the presence of two witnesses, 
during the deceased's last illness, to donate tissue. 
A The Written Request 
The section is silent on whether the request must be signed and in the 
hand of the donor. It is unlikely that a court, given the purpose of s 3 
(1 ), would insist on a handwritten request when pre-printed cards are 
available from the National Kidney Foundation of New Zealand. 
Similarly, a court would not insist on a signature if it was clear that the 
handwriting was that of the donor. 
At the time of the issue of a full driver's licence, the applicant has an 
opportunity of becoming a donor, if this occurs the word "donor" will be 
typed on the licence. This licence may be the only physical indication 
of a deceased's wish to donate a body part . If the donor's request to 
donate has not been entered on the correct computer the licence will be 
the only record on which the person in possession might rely. It is, 
however, doubtful that it would constitute a written request; it appears 
to be more a notice to check the computer under the control of the 
Director-General of Health, than an instruction in itself. Additionally, if the 
licence is not found on the donor, there may be doubt as to whether or 
not the licence is in fact that of the deceased. 
Section 3 (1 A) allows the person in possession to rely on a record of the 
request held on a computer under the control of the Director-General of 
Health. Potential donor details are entered into the Master Patient Index 
(which is a computer system under the control of the Director-General) 
and the Land Transport Safety Authority computer14 which is not under 
14This information was supplied by the National Kidney Foundation of New Zealand. 
Section 45 of the Transport (Vehicle and Driver Registration and Licencing) Act 1986, 
establishes a register of drivers licences and set outs the information that the register 
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the control of the Director-General. It is unlikely that the person in 
possession (who, for practical purposes, is often a doctor or nurse 
employed by a hospital) would have access to this computer. 
Paragraph 4.2(b) of A Code of Practice for Transplantation of the 
Cadaveric Organs 15 (the Code) does not contemplate access to the 
Land Transport Safety Authority computer, it states: 
If the National Master Patient Index indicates that the potential donor 
has requested that specified organs be used for transplantation, or 
that any part of the body be used for the treatment of others, hospital 
staff may communicate with the hospital or organisation where the 
signed request is retained , to ensure that the computer record is 
correct. 
The existence of two unrelated computer systems remains.16 It is now 
necessary to consider who has the authority to sign a written request, 
which is, of course, the source document of any computer record . 
B The Power to Donate 
1 Competency 
To be valid the written request will need to be made by a competent 
person17 . The Act does not require a minimum age to be obtained 
is to contain. Section 45 does not provide for the entering of donor details into the 
register. By storing donor information it appears that the Land Transport Safety 
Authority is acting ultra vires section 45 
15The Department of Health Working Party A Code of Practice for Transplantation of 
Cadaveric Organs (Department of Health, Wellington, 1987) 2 
16See text at n 96 
171 Kennedy and A Grubb Medical Law Text wffh Materials (2 ed , Butterworths, 
London, 1994)1148 
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before the request can be made. Lanham 18 (commenting on the 
identical wording of s 1 (1) of the UK Act) suggests that if a child is old 
enough to understand the nature of the request then it will be valid. If 
the child is not old enough then the s 3(1) procedure will not be 
applicable and the request will have to be made pursuant to s 3(2).19 
Should a young child's understanding of the request ever be queried, 
the House of Lord's decision in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech 
Area Health Authority<' may provide some guidance. While accepting 
that Gillick concerned the issue of whether or not a girl under 16 years 
of age could consent to contraceptive treatment without the express 
consent of her parents, it appears to be applicable to a child's 
understanding of the nature of request to donate organs. Fraser LJ 
agreed with the trial Judge and said that a doctor would be justified in 
providing contraceptive treatment if, though under 16 years of age, the 
girl understood his advice.21 Mason and McCall Smith described this 
as the "mature minor" principle.22 Paragraph 4.4 of the Code provides 
some practical guidance when it states that the agreement of the family 
or whanau should be obtained before a child 's request for removal of 
organs is carried out. 
2 The extent of the power 
The National Kidney Foundation of New Zealand 's form for the donation 
of organs23 does not require the donor to date the form at the time of 
18David Lanham "Transplants and the Human Tissue Act 1961 " (1971) 11 Med Sci Law 
16, 17 
19See text at n 29 
20 [1985] 3 All ER 402 
21 Above n 20, 413 
22Mason and McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics (4 ed, Butterworths, London, 1994) 
95 
23See Appendix 1 
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signing. It will be necessary to rely on other evidence to determine the 
child's age when the request was signed. 
The Foundation 's request form also fails to set out the same options 
available under s 3(1 ). The section allows for the donation of the body 
(or part of) for therapeutic purposes, "[O]r for purposes of medical 
education or research .. . i1 The request form specifies the options of: 
kidneys, eyes, heart, lungs, liver and bone transplantation. A wider 
option is also provided, it states, "Any part of my body be used for the 
treatment of others."24 It is doubtful that this option is wide enough to 
encompass the medical education and research purposes envisaged in 
the section. The wording also does not allow for the donation of the 
whole body for therapeutic purposes, medical education or research 
which is another option available under s 3(1 ).25 
The request form appears to reflect the confused wording of s 3(1 ). The 
section allows a donor to request his or her body (or part of) to be used 
for therapeutic purposes, medical education or research. However, the 
same section states that the person in possession of the body can only 
allow the removal of part of the body for the use requested .26 
Unfortunately, this anomaly was repeated when the 1989 amendment to 
the Act inserted s 3(1A). The relevant part of s 3(1) states:27 
24See Appendix 1 
25tt is accepted that Appendix 1 is entitled, "Form For Donation Of Organs For 
Therapeutic Purposes• and that it is printed by the National Kidney Foundation of New 
Zealand , whose principle aim is to increase the supply of organs 
26See above n 17, 1151 . Kennedy and Grubb record the same anomaly in s1 (1) of the 
Human Tissue Act 1961 (UK) 
27The author 's emphasis 
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If any person, ... has expressed a request that his body or any 
specified part of his body be used after his death for therapeutic 
purposes or purposes of medical education or research, the person 
lawfully in possession of his body after his death may, ... , authorise the 
removal from the body of any part or, as the case may be, the 
specified part for use in accordance with the request. 
The section appears to prevent the authorisation of the entire body 
being used for therapeutic purposes, medical education and/or 
research. The anomaly remains unexplained. 
If a written request does not exist the donor can request, in the 
presence of two witnesses during his or her last illness, that his or her 
body be used for therapeutic purposes. Kennedy and Grubb note that 
it is unlikely that the expression "last illness" will pose any interpretation 
problems, as hindsight (after the death of the donor) will assist in 
identifying the last illness. 
C Lawfully in Possession 
The common law right to possession of a body for burial purposes is 
acknowledged in s 2(2)(a) and (b) of the Act. The subsection states 
that, subject to any person's rights under any rule of law to possession 
of any body, the person for the time being in charge of a licenced 
hospital (under the Hospitals Act 1957 and the Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment & Treatment) Act 1992) within which a body 
is lying shall be the person lawfully in possession of the body .28 The 
section is a convenient deeming provision that allows hospital staff to act 
on a donor's request. It prevents any delay in waiting for the 
deceased's spouse (a person who is entitled to possession) to authorise 
the donor's request. 
28Section 2 (2)(c) of the Act deems the Superintendent of a penal institution to be the 
person in lawful possession of an inmate's body 
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Section 3 (6) of the Act specifically excludes an undertaker who is in 
lawful possession of the body, as a person who may authorise the 
removal of tissue under s 3. 
Section 3 (1) allows a person to specifically request that his or her body 
be used for donation purposes. Section 3(2) deals with the situation 
where the potential donor has not specifically consented to the removal 
of tissue. 
IV SECTION 3(2) 
Section 3(2) states: 
Without limiting subsection (1) of this section, it is hereby declared that 
the person lawfully in possession of the body of a deceased person 
may authorise the removal of any part of the body for use for the said 
purposes ~. having made such reasonable enquiry as may be 
practicable, he has no reason to believe -
(a) That the deceased person has expressed an objection to his 
or her body being so dealt with after death, and had not 
withdrawn it; or 
(b) That the surviving spouse or any surviving relative of the 
deceased person objects to the body being so dealt with. 
D The Power to Donate 
The subsection allows the person in possession to authorise the removal 
of tissue where that person has no reason to believe that the potential 
donor, or relative, opposes the removal. The inconsistent wording29 
within s 3(1) and s 3(1A) is continued in subsection (2). The s 3(2) 
person in possession is only allowed to authorise the removal of tissue, 
29See text at n 27 
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not it seems, release the body (or a part of it) for medical education or 
research. Section 3(2) also contains the requirement that the person be 
in lawful possession of the body; the meaning of this expression has 
already been discussed.30 The words not common to s 3(1) will now 
be considered. 
E Such Reasonable Enquiry as May Be Practicable 
The Act does not define 11 reasonable 11 or 
11practicable 11 • Skegg31 
suggests that a reasonable enquiry will have regard to the resources 
available to the person in possession. Secondly, the utility of the 
enquiry; the person in possession would not be expected to enquire of 
every available person known to the deceased when the chance of 
those persons revealing relevant information is slight. Thirdly, whether 
or not the subject of the enquiry is of an age or level of competence that 
would make an enquiry unreasonable. It would not be reasonable for 
enquiries to be made of a young child or a recently bereaved spouse. 
The interpretation of 11practicable 11 has produced two approaches. Skegg 
argues32 that the person in possession should, in determining how 
practicable an enquiry will be, be able to consider the optimum time 
within which a body part must be removed and transplanted. Skegg is 
of the view that s 1 (2) of the UK Act (the wording of which is identical to 
s 3(2) of the Act) represents a compromise between the principle 
purpose of the Act (to provide body parts) with the relative's right to 
object to the donation. He argues that the right to object is not absolute 
because it is tempered by the subsection's requirement that the 
objection only be ascertained after a reasonable enquiry. He concludes 
30See text at n 10, n 11 and n 28 
31 Peter Skegg "Human Tissue Act 1961" (1976) 16 Med Sci Law 197. Skegg 's 
discussion of reasonableness appears to be a development of Lanham 's views at 
above n 18, 197 
32Above n 31 , 197 
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that, 11 [T]here is no warrant for excluding from consideration the time 
within which a part must be removed if it is to be of use for the intended 
and approved purpose11 •33 
Dworkin takes a different view. He considers that the practicability of the 
enquiry, 11 [M]ust relate to the steps taken to trace the relatives not to the 
practicability of using the body, since the basis of the provision is to 
allow the relative to object if he so wishes."34 Kennedy and Grubb 
prefer Dworkin's approach.35 The Code also appears to support 
Dworkin's views. Paragraphs 4.3(a) to 4.3(e) deal broadly with 
reasonableness and practicability. Paragraph 4.3(d) endorses the view 
expressed in the United Kingdom Departmental Guidance Circular that: 
[l]n most instances it will be sufficient to discuss the matter with any 
one relative who has been in close contact with the deceased, asking 
him his own views, the views of the deceased and also ~ he has any 
reason to believe that any other relative would be likely to object. 
The same paragraph goes on to discuss the concepts of 
unreasonableness and impracticability in the context of not being able 
to locate relatives, having to speak with relatives who are young children, 
and/or relatives who are seriously ill. There is no reference to 
practicability being linked to the need to remove a part as quickly as 
possible. 
F The Objection 
The section does not specify what form the objection should take. 
However the scheme of the Act is such that whenever writing is required 
33Above n 31, 197 
34See Dworkin above n 10, 367 
35Above n 17, 1155 
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it is specifically set out.36 It is most likely that the objection will not 
need to be in writing. 
G The Surviving Spouse or any Surviving Relative 
The meaning of "surviving spouse" is clear. In comparison, the word 
"relative" is without definition and capable of many meanings. Section 
2 of the Adoption Act 1955 restrictively defines the word relative to 
mean, "[l]n relation to any child, a grandparent, brother, sister, uncle or 
aunt, whether of the full blood, of the half blood, or by affinity." The 
omission of parents, step-parents, great-aunts and uncles and de facto 
partners reduces the value of the Adoption Act definition. The Code 
does not directly assist with the meaning of relative however, paragraph 
4.437 states that it will be undesirable to remove a child's organs 
without the agreement of the "family" and/or "whanau". These words 
have a potentially wide definition which, when coupled with the statutory 
words, ''[A]ny surviving relative" may suggest that a wide interpretation 
will be favoured. 
H Objects 
Skegg prefers38 a broad interpretation of the word "objects", so that it 
includes potential objectors who could object if they knew of the 
proposal to remove an organ. Accordingly, he proposes that "objects" 
be extended to "would object". The Code, at paragraph 4.3(d) 
envisages the possibility of a potential objection when it states that a 
reasonable and practicable enquiry would involve asking a close relative 
of the deceased, "[l]f he has any reason to believe that any other relative 
36See above n 17, 1155 
37See text at n 21 
38Above n 31, 197 
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would be likely to object."39 
The uncertain meaning of words and expressions within ss 3 (1) and 3 
(2) has already been discussed. The uncertainty continues in s 3(4). 
V SECTION 3(4) 
Section 3(4) states: 
No such removal shall be effected except by a medical practitioner, 
who must have satisfied himself by personal examination of the body 
that life is extinct. 
I Life is Extinct 
The perhaps euphemistic expression "life is extinct" refers to death, 
which is not defined by the Act, or any other New Zealand statute. 
Traditionally, death has been defined as the irreversible cessation of 
heart beat and respiration. However, the advent of artificial respiratory 
and circulatory machines has meant that a person will remain "alive" long 
after the destruction of the brain stem. If the traditional definition of 
death is applied to this situation, the person would be defined as being 
alive, despite the fact that the destruction of the brain stem40 makes it 
impossible for that person to ever independently maintain a heartbeat or 
to breathe. The traditional definition of death must be seen as obsolete 
and unworkable. 
The need to define death is particularly important because of the very 
~he author's emphasis 
.w-rhat part of the brain that is responsible for the basic functions of life, eg breathing 
and heartbeat. The brain stem, of all the parts of the brain, is least affected by the lack 
of blood. Invariably the death of the brain stem occurs after the death of the cerebral 
hemispheres and those other areas of the brain responsible for the higher functions 
of life 
19 
nature of cadaveric transplantation. The successful donation of organs 
such as the heart, kidney and liver is inextricably linked to the time the 
organ is deprived of circulatory blood . The very best dead donors are 
those who lie in an intensive care unit artificially ventilated. They will 
have often suffered brain stem death as a consequence of a 
haemorrage or a violent accident which largely unaffects the quality of 
the organs; artificial ventilation then ensures that the organs are 
nourished by oxygenated blood. 
Paragraph 8 of the Code recognises the concept of brain stem death. 
It allows medical practitioners to diagnose death after the satisfactory 
conclusion of the clinical tests set out in the Code. Paragraph 9.4 of the 
Code says that after death, it is ethical to maintain , for a reasonable 
time, the artificial ventilation and respiration of corpses for the purpose 
of the removal of organs. 
In Scotland and England there has been judicial acceptance of the 
concept of brain stem death. In R v Malchere/<41 and R v Steelff
2 
both victims died as a consequence of violent attacks . However, they 
did not die immediately, it was diagnosed that their brain stems were 
dead and, on this basis, they were disconnected from their ventilators . 
It was alleged that the disconnection was the cause of their deaths and 
not the earlier violent acts. Lane CJ did not accept the argument and 
said:43 
Where a medical practitioner adopting methods which are generally 
accepted comes bona tide and conscientiously to the conclusion that 
the patient is for practical purposes dead , and that such vital functions 
41 [1981] 2 All ER 422 (CA) 
42 [1981] 2 All ER 422 (CA) 
43Above n 41 , 429 
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as exist (for example, circulation) are being maintained solely by 
mechanical means, and therefore discontinues treatment , that does 
not prevent the person who inflicted the in~ial injury from being 
responsible for the victim 's death. 
The concept found further acceptance in Re A44 . The Court, after 
hearing evidence of A's injuries, the tests carried out on him to ascertain 
brain stem death, and the opinion of a paediatric neurologist, granted 
a declaration that A was brain stem dead. The Court also held that A 
had been dead since the brain stem tests had been satisfied (some six 
days prior to the decision of the Court). 
The potential for a Malcherek/Stee/e45 causation argument remains in 
New Zealand. Given the Code 's acceptance of the artificial ventilation 
of cadavers and the concept of brain stem death it is unacceptable that 
there is no statutory definition of death that reflects established medical 
views. If the traditional definition of death is used, a doctor switching off 
a ventilation machine or removing an organ (from a brain stem dead 
person) that leads to that person's death might be in breach of ss 151 , 
160 and 164 of the Crimes Act 1961 . These sections deal with the duty 
to provide the necessities of life, the acceleration of death and culpable 
homicide. In Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-Generaf6 
Thomas J considered ss 151 and 164 in the context of an application for 
a declaration that ss 151 and 164 did not apply to doctors who wished 
to remove ventilatory support from a person suffering from Guillain-Barre 
syndrome. In granting the declaration the Court held, (in context of s 
151) that there was a lawful excuse to discontinue ventilation when to do 
44 [1992] 3 Med L R 303 (Fam D) 
45Above n 41 
46 [1993] 1 NLZR 235 
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so accorded with "good medical practice" .47 This expression was 
synonymous with 11proper medical standards and procedures" .48 While 
it is certainly arguable that the Auckland Health Board declaration would 
be applicable to doctors involved in the transplantation process, it would 
be preferable if there was statutory recognition of brain stem death. The 
supply of cadaveric organs should not be hindered by any legal 
uncertainty surrounding their removal from a ventilated donor. 
J Removal by a Medical Practitioner 
Section 3(4) also requires confirmation of death by the medical 
practitioner who is to remove the body parts. The Act does not exclude 
the possibility that the doctor who certifies death might also be the 
person in lawful possession as well as the transplant surgeon. However, 
the Code, at paragraph 8.6 prevents the actual transplant surgeon from 
diagnosing brain stem death. It allows for the determination of death by 
two suitably experienced doctors acting independently, neither one or 
whom can be a member of the transplant team or attending on the 
intended recipient of the organs. One of the doctors should be a 
specialist in charge of the care of the donor patient. 
The requirement that the removal be carried out by a medical 
practitioner is unnecessarily restrictive. In the United Kingdom the 
enactment of the Corneal Tissue Act 1986 (UK) acknowledged that 
skilled technicians were capable of removing corneas; this was 
previously prohibited by operation of s 2(4) of the UK Act (which is 
identical to s 3(4) of the Act). It is difficult to understand why a medical 
practitioner need remove a specified body part when that part is to be 
used, "(F]or [the] purposes of medical education or research". It is 
47 Above n 46, 250. The Court also held s 164 to be inapplicable in the circumstances 
see above n 46, 254-255 
48 Above n 46, 250 
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perhaps arguable that the words, in s 3(4), "[E]ffected by a medical 
practitioner ... ,"49 are wide enough to encompass a situation where a 
medical practitioner supervises the removal. Paragraph 9.5 of the Code 
does not support this interpretation and neither does the fact that the 
Corneal Tissue Act 1986 (UK) was enacted to avoid the restrictions 
imposed by the identical wording that appears in s 2(4) of the UK Act. 
Sections 3(1 ), 3(2) and 3(3) state when organs may and may not be 
removed and, as has just been discussed, provide for the mechanics of 
removal. In certain circumstances these sections are subject to the 
consent of the coroner. 
VI SECTION 3(5) 
Section 3(5) states: 
Where a person has reason to believe that an inquest may be required 
to be held on any body or that a postmortem examination of any body 
may be required by the coroner, he shall not, except with the consent 
of the coroner, -
(a) Give an authority under this section in respect of the body; or 
(b) Act on such an authority given by any other person. 
Sections 7, 8 and 20 of the Coroners Act 1988 stipulate when the 
coroner may authorise a postmortem examination and/or hold an 
inquest. Essentially, this will occur where there is reasonable cause to 
believe that the deceased died a sudden, violent or unnatural death, the 
cause of which is unknown . Unfortunately, the cadavers that are most 
likely to attract the interest of the coroner are the very same bodies that 
are likely to provide good sources of organs . Victims of crime and car 
49-y°he author's emphasis 
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accidents often suffer trauma to a particular part of their body that 
largely leaves the other parts in good condition. Lanham notes
50 the 
desirability of a coroner sending a general consent to the hospitals, that 
authorises the removal of various organs in certain circumstances in 
order to avoid the unnecessary loss of organs. 
The coroner's office in Wellington does not have a general consent form; 
it is also unlikely that such a form would be developed in the future . The 
office has stressed the importance of the coroner being notified of a 
death and being able to make a decision about the removal of organs 
on a case by case basis51. Paragraph 6.2 of the Code suggests that, 
"[T]he coroner can indicate in advance an intention to consent to the 
authorisation and removal of parts of the body if death occurs". 
Unfortunately, paragraph 6.2 does not reflect the practice in the 
Wellington region. It appears that the coroner is not prepared to adopt 
an approach that balances the need to supply organs with the duty, 
under the Coroners Act 1988, to investigate deaths. 
The discussion so far has concentrated on an analysis of the meaning 
and extent of the power to donate. It is, perhaps, not unreasonable to 
assume that a power will be coupled with a sanction for those who act 
in contravention of it ; this assumption will now be considered. 
50Above n 18, 22 
51This information was supplied by the Coroners Office, Department of Courts, 
Wellington 
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VII NON-COMPLIANCE WITH HUMAN TISSUE ACT 1964 
K Common Law Crimes 
The Act does not make the failure to comply with s 3 an offence .52 The 
issue of liability under the UK Act was debated by Skegg and Kennedy 
in a series of three articles.53 They considered the ancient common law 
crimes of preventing the lawful disposal of a body, indecency with a 
body and disobedience of a statute, and agreed that the common law 
crimes would not apply to a situation where there is an unauthorised, 
but limited, interference with a corpse for medical purposes.54Section 
9 of the Crimes Act 1961 abolishes common law crimes. 
L Section 150 of the Crimes Act 1961 
Although you cannot be convicted of the common law crimes relating to 
the disposal of (and interference with) bodies the offences are now in 
statutory form. Section 150 of the Crimes Act 1961 states: 
Misconduct in respect of human remains - everyone is liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years who -
(a) neglects to perform any duty imposed on him by law or 
undertaken by him w~h reference to the burial or cremation of 
any dead human body or human remains ; or 
(b) improperly or indecently interferes w~h or offers any indignfy 
to any dead human body or remains , whether buried or not. 
52The failure can be compared w~h s 12 of the Act which makes the performance of 
a post-mortem and an anatomical examination by anyone other than a medical 
pract~ioner, or licenced person an offence . 
53(i) PDG Skegg "Liabil~y for Unauthorised Removal of Cadaveric Transplant Material" 
(1974) 14 Med Sci Law 53 
(ii) I McC Kennedy "Further thoughts on Liability for Non-ObseNance of the Provisions 
of the Human Tissue Act 1961" (1976) 16 Med Sci Law 49 
(iii) PDG Skegg "Liabil~y for the Unauthorised Removal of Cadaveric Transplant 
Material: Some Further Comments" (1977) 17 Med Sci Law 123 
54See Skegg above n 53 (i) , 56 and Kennedy and Grubb above n 17, 1157 
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The section reflects societal respect for the dead human body and the 
tradition of a decent burial. From a more utilitarian perspective 
s150(a)55 protects the public's health by ensuring the disposal of a 
body by burial or cremation. 
The section is silent on the requirement of mens rea. Although a 
comprehensive discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
submitted that the section should be read so as to require mens rea. 
The use of the adverbs "improperly" and "indecently" and the words, 
"interferes with" and "or offers11 all imply a mental element. The fact that 
a conviction renders someone liable to imprisonment for a maximum of 
two years and that it would (particularly s150(b)) carry a good amount 
of stigma are a strong indicator of Parliament's intention to create an 
offence with mens rea. This was Parliament's intention with ss 145, 147, 
148 and 149 of the Crimes Act 1961 . These sections immediately 
precede s150 and all require proof of mens rea. The sections, along 
with s150, all appear under the title "Crimes Against the Public Welfare". 
Although it is difficult to envisage every way in which there might be a 
failure to adhere to s 3 of the Act, it is possible to speculate that the 
most likely scenario will be when there is a removal of a body part 
contrary to the wishes of the dead donor and/or the dead donor's 
surviving spouse or relative. 
This might occur when a relative or the person in charge of the hospital 
ignores a donor's subsequent withdrawal of a request to remove a body 
part and authorises the removal, which is then carried out. In this 
situation s 150(b) would not be applicable to the relative, or the person 
55Section 150 is one of four sections that appear under the t~le, "Crimes Against Public 
Welfare' in the Crimes Act 1961 
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in charge of the hospital, as it could not be said that either person has 
interfered with or offered any indignity to the dead body. 
If a transplant surgeon removed the organ in ignorance of the relative's 
unlawful authorisation, and believing that the removal was authorised in 
accordance with the Act, it is unlikely that the surgeon could be said to 
have, intended to improperly interfere with or offer an indignity to the 
dead donor's body. If the person in possession of the body was also 
the transplant surgeon (a situation which the Act does not appear to 
exclude) a conviction under s150(b) may succeed, if it could be proved 
that the surgeon ignored an instruction under the Act not to remove an 
organ and then proceeded to remove the body part. 
A successful conviction would be just as much dependent on the 
meaning of "improperly" and "offers any indignity" as it would require 
proof of mens rea. The most obvious purpose of s 150 is to prevent 
necrophilic acts and gross physical abuse. The words "indecently" and 
"indignity'' support such an interpretation. In ascertaining the meaning 
of "improperly" a purposive approach to the subsection suggests that 
the words are interpreted to mean indecent. If such a view was adopted 
it is difficult to understand how the removal of organs (in a clinically 
acceptable way) for the ultimate benefit of a patient could be described 
as improper, indecent and/or amounting to an indignity. It is accepted 
that it is arguable that s150(b) is capable of having as one of its 
purposes, the prevention of disfigurement or mutilation of a dead body. 
Such a view would accord with a wider aim of enforcing respectful 
conduct towards the dead and not just the specific act of necrophilia. 
In these circumstances, the unauthorised removal of organs might 
amount to a disfigurement or, perhaps, an indignity to a dead body. 
Even so, it would still be necessary to prove mens rea; to do so would 
be difficult if it was the transplant surgeon's intention to provide an organ 
for the benefit of a renal patient. 
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Section 150(b) is of less use when considering more 
11technical11 
breaches of the Act. The section is of little assistance where: 
(i) Contrary to s 3(4) someone other than a medical practitioner 
removes an organ, as occurred in R v Lennox-Wrighf'6; 
(ii) Contrary to s 3(4) a medical practitioner removes an organ 
without personally confirming that life is extinct; 
(iii) Contrary to s3(5) the person in possession authorises the 
removal of an organ where that person knew that a post-mortem 
or inquest may be required; 
(iv) Contrary to s3(5) a transplant surgeon acts in accordance with 
the authorisation in (iii). 
It is clear that s 150(b) is an unsatisfactory mechanism for ensuring 
compliance with s 3. 
M Section 107 of the Crimes Act 1961 
The most likely means of ensuring compliance will be a prosecution 
under s 107 of the Crimes Act 1961. Section 107(a) and (b) states: 
Contravention of Statute - everyone is liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding one year who, without lawful excuse, contravenes 
any enactment by wilfully doing any act which it forbids, or by wilfully 
omitting to do any act which it requires to be done, unless -
(a) some penalty or punishment, is expressly provided by law in 
respect of such contravention as aforesaid; or 
(b) in the case of any such contravention in respect of which no 
penalty or punishment is so provided , the act forbidden or 
required to be done is solely of an administrative or a 
ministerial or procedural nature, or it is otherwise inconsistent 
with the intent and object of the enactment, or with its context, 
that the contravention should be regarded as an offence. 
56 [1973] Crim L R 529 
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The section is the statutory embodiment of the common law crime of 
disobedience of a statute. In R v Lennox-Wrighf7 . The Defendant, 
who had failed medical examinations, was charged with, "doing an act 
in disobedience of a statute by removing parts of a dead body contrary 
to s1 (4) of the Human Tissue Act 1961".58 Section 1 (4) of the UK Act 
(which is equivalent to s 3(4) of the Act) prevents anyone other than a 
medical practitioner removing a body part. The Court confirmed the 
existence of the ancient common law crime except where it is specifically 
excluded by the statute. R v Lennox-Wright was effectively overruled 
in R v Horseferry Road Justices ex p Independent Broadcasting 
Authority59 Lloyd J said :60 
[l]n the case of a modern statute it is easier to infer that Parliament 
does not intend to create an offence unless it says so. There is no 
longer any presumption, if indeed there ever were , that a breach of 
duty imposed by statute is indictable. Nowadays the presumption, if 
any , is the other way ; although I would prefer to say that it requires 
clear language, or a very clear inference, to create a crime. 
Despite the demise of its common law ancestors 107 remains. Section 
107(a) and (b) clearly require mens rea but its application to the Act is 
conceptually difficult. The operative words require a wilful doing of a 
forbidden act or the wilful omission of an act required to be done. 
However the language of s 3 of the Act is not that of the prohibitory or 
mandatory kind encountered in penal or regulatory statutes. The words 
of ss3(1 ), 3(2) and 3(5) of the Act are discretionary and passive in 
nature . They are compound sections that allow for the exercise of an 
57Above n 56 
58See above n 53(ii), 52 
59 [1986] 2 All ER 666 
60Above n 59, 674 
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option (eg removal of an organ), subject to a reasonable belief (on the 
part of a second party) that a third party may not want the removal to 
be carried out. This method of drafting does not rest easily with the 
wilful doing or omission of an act or requirement as set out in s 107 of 
the Crimes Act 1961. With the exception of s 3(4)61, s 3 is not 
expressed in terms of forbidden or mandatory acts; it occupies a poorly 
delineated territory between a rights orientated section and a regulatory, 
prohibitory section. Perhaps with the possibility of s 107 of the Crimes 
Act potentially applying to a broad category of statutes, it has been 
suggested62 that s 107 applies to only two categories of statutes. The 
first category is where a statute creates or defines an offence and 
contemplates prosecution by indictment but fails to provide for a 
punishment. This category also applies where summary prosecution is 
provided, as an option, and a penalty is also provided . The second 
category applies to those statutes which contemplate a person being 
criminally responsible for the breach but fail to create an offence or a 
punishment. Section 15563 of the Crimes Act 1961 which imposes a 
duty to have and use reasonable knowledge when carrying out a 
medical procedure, is cited as an example of the latter category . It was 
concluded64 that s 107 of the Crimes Act 1961 should be construed 
61 Section 3(4) states: 
No such removal shall be effected except by a medical practitioner, who must 
have satisfied himself by personal examination of the body that life is ext inct . 
~he Honourable J Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (Brooker & Friend 
Limited , Wellington, 1992) 1G-9 
63Section 155 of the Crimes Act 1961 states: 
Duty of Persons Doing Dangerous Acts - everyone who undertakes (except 
in case of necessity) to administer surgical or med ical treatment , or to do any 
other lawful act the doing of which is or may be dangerous to life, is under a 
legal duty to have and to use reasonable knowledge, skill and care in doing 
any such act , and is criminally responsible for the consequences of omitting 
without lawful excuse to discharge that duty. 
64Above 62, 1 G-9 
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restrictively and where the statutory provision has, "[T)he clear indicia of 
imposing criminal responsibility ... "65 . 
The closest s 3 comes to imposing criminal responsibility is the 
implication in s 3(3)66 that the removal and use of body parts without 
authority is unlawful. It is submitted that given the failure of s 3(4) to 
create an offence and to provide a punishment
67
, s 107 of the Crimes 
Act 1961 would not apply. 
It is concluded that a breach of the s 3 is unlikely to result in a 
conviction under any statute . The discussion will now turn to civil liability 
for breaches of the section. 
N Civil Liability 
To bring a claim for common law damages it is necessary to avoids 14 
of the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act (ARCIA) . 
Section 14 bars proceedings for damages arising directly or indirectly 
out of a personal injury as defined in the ARCIA. Section 4 of the ARCIA 
restrictively defines "personal injury" to mean, "[T)he death of, or physical 
injuries to, a person, and any mental injury suffered by that person which 
is an outcome of those physical injuries to that person ... i' . Section 3 of 
the ARCIA defines mental injury as "[A] clinically significant behavioural , 
psychological, or cognitive disfunction ." Section 8(3) acknowledges 
(but does not define) another form of mental trauma when it extends the 
65Above n 62, 1 G-9 
66Section 3(3) states: 
Subject to subsections (4) and (5) of this section, the removal and use of any 
part of a body in accordance with an authority given in pursuance of this 
sect ion shall be lawful. 
67The failure can be compared with s 12 of the Act that creates an offence, prescribes 
a manner of prosecution and sets a penalty for anyone who contravenes the sections 
of the Act relating to the performance and conduct of post mortems and anatomical 
examinations 
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meaning of personal injury to include mental or nervous shock which is 
an outcome of a sexual crime listed in the first schedule of the ARCIA. 
A third category of mental trauma that does not fit within the two earlier 
categories is that of transient emotional trauma which is characterised 
as being fear, anger, humiliation and distress.68 In summary69 
A mental injury alone, even if it is of serious type defined in s 3 or a 
lesser type such as nervous shock or a transient emotional 
disturbance, is outside the definition and therefore a damages action 
is not barred. 
Both Skegg and Kennedy70 discussed the possibility of a claim in tort 
for negligently causing nervous shock by removing tissue without 
authority. As any nervous shock suffered in this situation would not be 
the outcome of a physical injury or sexual offence, a claim in negligence 
would not be barred . A final barrier to proceeding with the claim might 
be s 14 of the ARCIA which prevents proceedings for damages, 
"[A]rising directly or indirectly out of personal injury covered by this 
Act.. .. " 
It is unlikely that this barrier would prevent the claim . The nervous shock 
suffered cannot be defined as a personal injury because it is not the 
outcome of a physical injury. The nervous shock would be a 
consequence of: the person in possession failing to make a reasonable 
and practicable enquiry of relatives that were known to exist and the 
subsequent authorisation and removal of the organs. 
The scope of the s 14 bar has not yet been the subject of a substantive 
68D A Rennie and J M Miller (eds) Brookers Accident Compensation in New Zealand 
(Brookers Limited, Wellington, 1992) Volume 2, 2A-6 
69 Above n 68 2A-7 
70See above n 53(i) 53 and 54, n 53(ii) , 50 and 51 and n 53(iii) 1 - 4 
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decision; although existing defendants have been unsuccessful in using 
it as a ground to strike out plaintiffs' claims for nervous shock.
71 
The most recent House of Lord's decision concerning psychiatric injury 
is Page v Smith.72 Page was involved in a car accident caused by 
the negligence of Smith. Page did not suffer a physical injury but 
suffered a worsening of his existing chronic fatigue syndrome. Page 
claimed that his condition was now permanent and that it was unlikely 
that he would be able to continue his employment. The Court 
considered whether foreseeability of physical injury was sufficient to 
enable Page to recover damages for psychiatric damage or whether 
foreseeability of the psychiatric injury would be necessary. In reaching 
its conclusion the Court held that it was necessary to distinguish 
between primary and secondary victims. Primary victims are identified 
as suffering from a psychiatric illness because of their actual involvement 
in an accident. Secondary victims are those who suffer psychiatric 
damage because they passively and unwillingly witnessed an accident. 
Page was a primary victim. In respect of primary victims
73
: 
[l]t was enough to ask whether the defendant should have reasonably 
foreseen that the plaintiff might suffer physical [personal] injury as a 
result of the defendant's negligence, so as to bring him within the 
range of the defendant's duty of care. It was unnecessary to ask , as 
a separate question, whether the defendant should reasonably have 
foreseen injury by shock; and it is irrelevant that the plaintiff did not, 
in fact, suffer any external physical injury . 
71 See Boe v Hammond Unreported, 26 May 1995, High Court, Wellington Registry, 
M3/95 and McDonnell v Wellington Area Health Board Unreported, 16 December 
1994 and 13 March 1995, High Court, Wellington Registry , CP250/93 
72 [1995] 2 WLR 644 
73Above n 72,669 and 668H 
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Because of the danger of a negligent defendant, "[B]eing liable to all the 
world,"74 policy mechanisms were imposed to limit the number of 
secondary victims that could claim . In cases involving psychiatric 
damage to secondary victims it will be necessary to prove that the 
psychiatric injury was foreseeable in a person of normal fortitude, that 
the victim was sufficiently proximate in time and space to the accident 
and the victim enjoyed a proximate relationship (based on love and 
affection) with the primary victim .75 
In Mcloughlin v O'Brian76 the plaintiff claimed damages for the 
psychiatric illness suffered as a consequence of her learning about a car 
accident in which her husband and three children were involved and 
subsequently visiting them in hospital where she was told one of her 
children had been killed . Wilberforce LJ excluded the possibility of 
being compensated for psychiatric damage brought about by 
communication by a third party .77 
In the context of an unauthorised removal of an organ it is likely that the 
person in possession, and/or the transplant surgeon, would reasonably 
foresee personal injury being caused to those relatives or spouses 
known to him or her. Implicit in this test is the assumption that those 
relatives would be primary victims. The classification of the plaintiff in 
any claim of this nature would be one of fact. Suffice to say, that it is 
unlikely that any relatives who find out about the removal as a 
74Above n 72, 668 
75Above n 72, 668 and 675. See also Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
[1992] 1 AC 310 (HL) . Alcock involved a claim by the relatives (the secondary victims) 
of victims (the primary victims) of the Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster who had 
suffered nervous shock as a consequence of seeing the disaster etther while at the 
stadium or while watching television footage 
76 [1983] 1 AC, 410 
77 Above n 76, 423 
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consequence of a communication from a third party funeral director or 
another relative will be successful. These people would fit within the 
Mcloughlin78 prohibition and, or, find it difficult to prove their claim as 
secondary victims because of the Page79 policy mechanisms working 
against them. 
Another tort that may impose liability is that of a breach of statutory duty. 
Solomons v R Gertzenstein LimitecfO concerned a breach of the 
London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939. It was held that while the 
duties under the Act were for the general good of the public, the 
particular duty under s 133:81 
[W]as imposed for the benefit of a particular ascertainable class, 
namely, the persons in the building, and those persons have a right 
of action for a breach of statutory duty, notwithstanding that penalties 
are also provided for breaches. 
The first question must be whether s 3 of the Act imposes a duty on 
someone. Kennedy82 argues that s 1 (2) of the UK Act (which is 
identical to s 3(2) of the Act) imposes a duty on the person in 
possession to authorise the removal of parts only after a reasonable and 
practicable enquiry is made to ensure that neither the deceased nor the 
78See text at n 76 
79See text at n 75 
80 [1954] 2 QB 243 
81 Above n 80, 261. There exists another test which is called "the alternative modes of 
enforcement test" . It requires an investigation into whether the statute expressly 
provides for a remedy. If a remedy is not provided for it is possible that a claim might 
be allowed. However the test remains vague and difficult to apply. In Dominion 
Airlines Limited v Strand [1933] NZLR 1, a claim was allowed despite the statute 
allowing a penalty, see also Gardiner v McManus [1971] NZLR 475. As the test still 
requires a spec~ic class and breach to be established it is unlikely to assist in 
establishing a civil remedy for a breach of the Human Tissue Act 1964 
82Above n 53(ii), 51 
35 
surviving spouse or relatives would object. Similarly, s 3 (5) of the Act 
imposes a duty on the person in possession not to authorise removal 
where the person has reason to believe that the body may be needed 
for an inquest or post-mortem. 
Skegg83 argues against s 1 (2) of the UK Act creating a duty. He says 
that s 1 of the UK Act does not require people to act in a particular way, 
rather s 1 (3) of the UK Act (s 3(3) of the Act) simply makes the 
authorisation and removal of an organ lawful if the section is adhered to. 
Skegg ends his argument by noting that s 1 of the UK Act (s 3 of the 
Act) is by no means consistent in the creation of duties. It is unclear if 
the passive, 11 Reason to believe ... 11 , ins 3(1) of the Act creates a duty and 
to whom that duty is owed. The same uncertainty exists if, contrary to 
s 3(4) of the Act, someone other than a medical practitioner removes an 
organ. Kennedy's analysis of s 1 (2) of the UK Act (s 3(2) of the Act) is 
to be preferred; a reading of the subsection clearly indicates the creation 
of a duty. However, Skegg's reservations carry some force in respect 
of the balance s 3 of the Act. 
If the class test is applied to ss 3(1 ), 3(2) and 3(5) of the Act it is 
necessary to ask if they are for the benefit of the general public or for a 
specific class of people. Section 3(1) of the Act appears to convey a 
benefit to the public . It allows 11 [A]ny person ... 11 , to not only donate an 
organ, but to have any subsequent withdrawal of the authorisation 
obeyed. The section does not envisage a specified class of people. 
Section 3(2)(a) and (b) envisages a benefit to the deceased in that an 
objection against removal is honoured after death, and to the surviving 
spouses and relatives insofar as they have a right to object to the 
removal. At first blanch it appears that these people fit within a specific 
83Above n 53(iii), 124 and 125 
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class, but on closer analysis they constitute a general body of people; 
as all people will one day be eligible to fit within the "deceased" 
category. Similarly, most people will, at some stage, be a "surviving 
relative", and a significant number will be accorded the status of a 
"surviving spouse". It is possible to counter by saying that the class is 
defined and specific because they are limited in scope by the 
reasonably practicable enquiry that is to be carried out by the person in 
possession. Such an argument concentrates on the individual 
circumstances of each death and assumes that the enquiry (by the 
person in possession) would restrict the class. A proper approach is to 
concentrate on the wording of s 3(2)(a) and (b) which is all 
encompassing. There is also an absence of any statutory intent to 
protect a particular class of people .84 Ifs 3(2)(a) and (b) did create a 
class of people who could issue proceedings, it is still necessary to 
prove a breach of duty. Potentially this is difficult
85 because the 
reasonably practicable nature of the duty is not absolute. Should this 
hurdle be cleared the harm done will need to be that which the 
subsection was designed to prevent. Any harm suffered is likely to be 
a form of psychiatric injury. It is by no means certain that s 3(2)(a) and 
(b) created a duty to protect the class from this harm. The duty is far 
more likely to exist to strike a balance between the demand for (and the 
freedom of the deceased to donate) organs and the right of relatives, 
spouses and the deceased to object to donation. 
A breach of s 3(5) is likely to provide the best chance of success for the 
tort. This section identifies a specific class of person (the coroner) and 
imposes a duty on the person in possession not to authorise the 
removal of organs if the person has reason to believe that a post-
Mrhis can be compared with the principal object of the Health and Safety in 
Employment Act 1992 which is to prevent harm to employees at work 
85See Kennedy above n 53(ii) , 52 
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mortem or inquest might be held. The duty is for the benefit of the 
coroner in that it allows for an enquiry into violent and/or unexplained 
deaths. The people most likely to have a reason to believe are those 
employees of the hospital that is in lawful possession of the body. The 
failure of the person in possession to ascertain, in advance, the 
coroner's requirements or to inadequately inform the coroner of the 
nature of death and the organs needed (contrary to paragraph 62 of the 
Code)86 would help prove a breach of the statutory duty. It is unlikely 
that the coroner would suffer any mental injury or experience anger or 
humiliation. It would, however, be open to the court to award exemplary 
damages to punish the person in possession. The practical use of the 
tort is that it would allow the coroner to claim a prohibitory injunction 
against the person in possession. This would be of use in stopping any 
threatened breach of s 3(5) which is likely to be of greater significance 
to the coroner than any subsequent award of damages which could 
never compensate for the loss of an intact body. 
The final civil remedy to be considered is that connected with the 
cadaver itself. Relying on the common law right to possession of a 
corpse for burial Skegg87 considers that the unauthorised 
interference88 with a cadaver that prevents burial would amount to a 
cause of action giving rise to damages. The development of an 
additional cause of action occurred in Edmonds v Armstrong Funeral 
Home Limitea69. In Edmonds a husband sued a funeral home on 
whose premises an unauthorised post-mortem had been carried out on 
his wife. Importantly, there was no evidence that the body was detained 
86See text at n 50 and n 51 
87 Above n 53(iii) and see text at n 1 o and n 11 
88Skegg suggests that a person may wish to ventilate the cadaver so that it may be 
maintained as an organ bank 
89[1931] 1 DLR 676 
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longer than it would have otherwise been. The husband claimed 
damages for the mutilation and removal of parts from the body. It was 
held by the appellate division of the Alberta Supreme Court that the, 
"[U]nlawful mutilation of the body and the removal of certain parts ... 
constituted a violation of the plaintiff's right of custody and control and 
would consequently give a right of action... ."90 It is clear from this 
judgment that a cause of action exists even if the interference does not 
have the effect of preventing the disposal of the body. However, it is 
important to note that the ability of the husband to sue depended on 
him having the right to the custody and control of the body .
91 
This limitation has the effect of preventing other relatives, who are not 
entitled to possession, from suing. In the context of s 3 of the Act this 
is anomalous. The section allows surviving relatives to object to the 
removal but the common law denies the same people a cause of action. 
The survey of the way in which non-compliance with s 3 might be 
remedied has revealed that there are no simple and inexpensive means 
to ensure obedience with the section. Having discussed the absence 
of compliance provisions and analysed the meaning and purpose of s 
3 it is now necessary to investigate the policy behind the section. 
VIII THE POLICY OF SECTION 3 
There are two broad policy alternatives to be considered in the context 
of organ transplantation legislation; contracting in (opting in) and 
90Above n 89, 681 
91 Above n 89,680. See also Skegg at n 53(iii), 51 and 52 and Kennedy at n 53(ii), 60. 
Kennedy interprets the facts in Edmonds v Armstrong Funeral Home Limited to 
constttute an interference wtth the right of burial. This view of the facts is not 
supported by the report of the decision 
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contracting out (opting out). Contracting in allows the removal of organs 
from those who specifically request such removal during their lifetime. 
Contracting out allows for the removal of organs from everyone except 
from those who, before death, register an objection to the removal. The 
policy of s 3 of the Act is a hybrid, in that it combines the two 
approaches. Section 3(1) represents a contracting in scheme which 
allows for removal, if requested in the correct form, subject to the 
donor's right to withdraw the request. 
Section 3(2) of the Act is an example of a diluted contracting out 
scheme. It allows for the removal of organs (where there has been no 
prior request) unless the person in possession has reason to believe the 
donor, or one of the relatives or spouses objects. Kennedy
92 has 
stated that ss 1 (1) and 1 (2) of the UK Act (ss 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act) 
are a compromise between the five competing interests in organ 
transplantation. He lists the interests in the form of questions, namely : 
should the deceased have a right to dictate how his or her body is used 
after death?; should the deceased 's relatives or spouses views on 
removal prevail over those previously expressed by the deceased?; 
should a potential donee have a right to an organ irrespective of the 
donor's or relative 's views?; should religious and/or cultural groups have 
a right to say how a deceased's body is to be treated? ; should society 
have to bear the economic and emotional cost of maintaining potential 
donees on expensive dialysis machines, when many useful organs are 
being buried or cremated? 
Having identified the interests, Kennedy93 is of the view that ss 1 (1) and 
921an Kennedy "The Donation and Transplantation of Kidneys: Should the Law be 
Changed?" (1979) 5 Journal of Medical Ethics 13, 15. For a reply see Robert A Sells 
"Lets Not Opt Out: Kidney Donation and Transplantation" (1979) 5 Journal of Medical 
Ethics, 165 
93See above n 92, 15 and 16 
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1 (2) of the UK Act rank the deceased's expressed view as the first 
priority and the spouse's and relatives' power to object (where the 
deceased has not made an earlier request) as the second priority. This 
power also provides a means by which cultural and religious beliefs can 
be expressed. Kennedy concludes by saying :94 
The dying and society at large play very much third fiddle in having 
their interests and needs satisfied, a rather surprising result when the 
stated aim of the Act in the long t~le [is to allow "the removal of human 
tissue for therapeutic purposes and for purposes of medical education 
and research']. 
It is difficult to disagree with Kennedy's criticism. Section 3 is an 
unhappy compromise between the need to secure organs and rights of 
the donor and relatives to determine what will happen with the body. 
The confused drafting and the absence of any penalty provisions are 
both hallmarks of legislation devised without a dominant policy objective, 
other than that which sought to please everyone. The ineffectiveness is 
only exacerbated by the fact that advances in medical technology have 
created clinical possibilities beyond the contemplation of legislation 
drafted in the early nineteen sixties. 
Reform can be carried out by adopting a new policy towards organ 
transplantation95 or by accepting the existing policy and amending s 3. 
IX REFORM OF SECTION 3(1) 
The following changes would clarify s 3(1 ). 
94Above n 92, 16 and the long rnle of the Act 
95See text at n 109 
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0 A Written Request 
The donee should be required to sign and date a clear request to 
donate, or a pre-printed standardised request form . The provision of a 
minimum set of requirements for any written request would also assist 
in the development of a single national database of those prepared to 
donate organs. The following sub-section could be added: 
3(1 )(B) For the purposes of sub-section (1) of this section a request 
"in writing" shall be either a request in the hand of the person 
or a printed form ; the request shall be signed by , and include 
the age of, the person and record the date on which the 
request is made. 
It is interesting to note that Part IV of the Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW), 
(the New South Wales Act) does not require the deceased 's request to 
be in writing . Sections 23(1) (a) and 24(1 )(b) allow a designated person 
to remove tissue where, ''the deceased person had, during the person 's 
lifetime, expressed the wish for, or consented to, the removal. ... " In 
contrast, Part IV of the Human Tissue Act 1982 (Viet) (the Victoria Act) , 
requires writing . Sections 26(1 )(c)(i) and 26(2)(c)(i) allow for the removal 
of tissue where, "the deceased person - had at any time, in writing ; ... 
expressed the wish for, or consented to , the removal. ... " 
Neither of the two Australian Acts provide for the establishment for a 
national database. Given the existence of two computer systems in New 
Zealand96 it is important that the records are consolidated. Any re-
appraisal of s 3 should incorporate a provision establishing one national 
computer register. 
There is no reason why s 3(1) should limit an oral request to being 
spoken during the person 's last illness. As it stands s 3(1) is too 
96See text at n 14 and n 16 
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restrictive. It is non-sensical that s 3(1) only allows an oral request to be 
made by an ill person and not a healthy person . The deletion of the 
words, "[D)uring this last illness .... 11 would not alter the contracting in 
policy of s 3(1 ). 
P The Power to Donate 
The fixing of 16 years as the age to be obtained before consent can be 
given for the removal of organs would remove any doubt about the 
capacity of minors to donate body parts. It is accepted that the fixing 
of any age is, by its nature, arbitrary. A requirement that competents 
only be allowed to donate will exclude persons suffering from psychiatric 
illness. 
Q The Extent of the Power to Donate 
The existing statutory anomaly97 that prevents the person in possession 
carrying out the donee's request to have his or her entire body used for 
therapeutic purposes or medical education or research could be 
remedied by the deletion of the following italicised words: 
"[A]uthorise the removal from the body of any part or, as the case 
may be, the specified part, for use in accordance with the request". 
and the insertion of the following words in italics: 
[A]uthorise the use of the body, or any part of it in accordance with 
the request. 
These words could also be used to remedy the same anomaly that 
appears in ss 3(1A) and 3(2). 
97 See text at n 26 
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X REFORM OF SECTION 3(2) 
R The Concepts of Reasonableness and Practicability 
The Skegg/Dworkin debate98 about the meaning of practicability would 
be resolved if the word was removed from s 3(2). Sections 23 and 24 
of the New South Wales Act and s 26 of the Victoria Act all require the 
designated person to make, "[S]uch enquiries as are reasonable in the 
circumstances... ." in relation to the wishes of the deceased and the 
next of kin. The need for a reasonable enquiry is wide enough to 
encompass the need to mount an enquiry and the nature of the enquiry 
itself. The word "circumstances" suggests that what is reasonable will , 
in part, be linked to the need to move quickly to ensure the best use of 
the organs. 
However, the favoured approach, that promotes the availability of 
organs, requires reasonableness to be read in the context of time. The 
following wording is suggested: 
(T)he person may authorise the removal of any part ... ~ having made 
such enquiries as are reasonable (in the time before the part must be 
removed so that tt remains in optimum condttion for transplantation 
purposes) he/she has no reason to believe .... 
S The Surviving Spouse or any Surviving Relative 
The meaning of "relative" is unclear, however when read with the words 
"[O]r any surviving ... " and the Code's99 directive to confer with the 
"family" and/or "whanau" a broad interpretation is likely .
100 The 
approach of the New South Wales and Victoria Acts is to identify and 
98See text at n 31 and n 34 
99Paragraph 4.4 
100See text at n 37 
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rank the next of kin who may object to the proposed removal. The 
interpretation sections 101 of the New South Wales and Victoria Acts 
rank the "senior available next of kin" in ascending order, namely: 
(i) The spouse of the deceased 
(ii) A son or daughter (over 18 years) of the deceased where the 
deceased was not married or the spouse is not available 
(iii) A parent of the deceased where the next of kin at (i) and (ii) are 
not available, and 
(iv) A brother or sister where the next of kin at (i), (ii) and (iii) are not 
available. 
Section 22 of the New South Wales Act deems a de facto partner who, 
"[W]as at the time of the deceased person's death living with the 
deceased person as the deceased person's spouse on a bona tide 
domestic basis ... 11 a spouse. The Victoria Act does not include a similar 
provision. 
The adoption of the identifiable next of kin in the place of the ill defined 
"relative" is a workable alternative. It is also likely to accord with 
commonly held views on the seniority of close family relations, and is 
sufficiently wide to enable (via the senior available next of kin) the 
influence of cultural and religious views on the removal of organs. The 
reasonable enquiry that is to be undertaken by the doctor would be 
made infinitely easier, simply because the doctor would know who he or 
she would have to approach. 
101 Section 3(1) of the Victoria Act and s 4(1) of the New South Wales Act 
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XI REFORM OF SECTION 3(4) 
T Life is Extinct 
A statutory definition of death in New Zealand is overdue. The brain 
stem/cessation of all brain function definition of death is now well 
accepted.102 Sections 33 and 41 of the New South Wales and Victoria 
Acts both state that death occurs when there is, "[l]rreversible cessation 
of all function of the person's brain; or irreversible cessation of 
circulation of blood in the person's body." The Acts also allow for the 
certification of death by two medical practitioners, neither of whom can 
be the person giving the authority to remove the organ, or the person 
acting on the authority.103 The adoption of similar provisions would 
clarify s 3(4) and, at the same time, reflect paragraph 8 of the Code 
which recognises irreversible cessation of brain function as death. 
Paragraph 8 also prevents the donee's doctor (or the transplant 
surgeon) diagnosing the death of the donor. 
U Removal by a Medical Practitioner 
The New South Wales and Victoria Acts only permit the removal of tissue 
to be performed by a medical practitioner104 . Section 1 of the Corneal 
Tissue Act 1986 (UK) 105 allows corneas to be removed by a person 
102See text at n 40 and n 44 
103see ss 26 and 27 of the New South Wales Act and ss 25 and 26(7) of the Victoria 
Act 
104see ss 27 and 25 of the New South Wales Act and the Victoria Act 
105section 1 of the Corneal Tissue Act 1986 (UK) amends s 1 (4) of the Human Tissue 
Act 1961 (UK). The relevant portion of the amended s 1 (4A) states: 
No such removal of an eye or part of any eye shall be effected except by ... 
(b) a person in the employment of a health authority acting on the instructions 
of a registered medical practitioner who must , before giving those instructions, 
be satisfied that the person in question is sufficiently qualified and trained to 
perform the removal competently and must also either -
(i) have satisfied himself by personal examination of the body 
that life is extinct , or 
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other than a medical practitioner. It requires that the person be in the 
employment of a health authority and that the medical practitioner who 
has certified death be satisfied that the person is sufficiently qualified 
and trained. A simple amendment to the Act would allow the removal 
of parts by skilled technicians in addition to medical practitioners. 
XII REFORM OF SECTION 3(5) 
V The Coroner's Consent 
There exists the possibility that organs will not be able to be removed 
because of the failure to secure the coroner's consent to their removal. 
Section 3 and the New South Wales Act do not provide for the coroner 
issuing an advance directive setting out the circumstances when removal 
can be performed without the permission of the coroner. Section 27(3) 
of the Victoria Act does, however, state that: 
A coroner may give a direction e~her before or after the death of a 
person that his consent to the removal of tissue from the body of the 
person after the death of the person is not required .. . . 
It is uncertain whether the sub-section envisages the coroner having any 
prior knowledge of a particular person or a general class of persons. 
The use of the indefinite article suggests that the sub-section may 
contemplate a class of people which the coroner may identify as being 
able to have certain organs removed in certain circumstances. If th is 
interpretation was adopted an advance directive could be issued. An 
amendment to s 3(5) allowing for an advance coroner's directive to a 
category of deceased, or terminally ill, persons would remove any 
(ii) be sat isfied that life is ext inct on the basis of a statement to 
that effect by a registered medical practitioner who has 
sat isfied himself by personal examinat ion of the body that 
life is ext inct . 
47 
residual doubt or uncertainty about the coroner's requirements. It would 
remove the potential for the loss of organs that may well be irrelevant to 
any subsequent post mortem or inquest. 
XIII AN ADDITIONAL SECTION 
The failure to make non-compliance with the Act an offence is an 
anomaly. The New South Wales Act makes it an offence 106 for the 
senior next of kin to authorise the removal (contrary to the instructions 
of the deceased or another next of kin) of organs, where the deceased 
is at a place other than a hospital; the penalty is $1,000.00. Curiously, 
an offence107 doesn't appear to have been committed in New South 
Wales if a designated person authorises the removal of organs while the 
deceased is in a hospital and contrary to the wishes of the deceased or 
the next of kin . Both the New South Wales Act and the Victoria Act108 
make it an offence to remove tissue from a body without sufficient 
authority. The penalty prescribed in New South Wales, on summary 
conviction is $4,000.00 and/or six months imprisonment. An offence 
section in the Act would need to encompass acts done by the person 
in possession and the transplant surgeon that are contrary to s 3 of the 
Act. 
The foregoing discussion has considered reforms that would make 
section 3 a more satisfactory mechanism for the procurement of organs 
for therapeutic purposes. The reforms did not involve a change to the 
underlining hybrid policy of the section. 
106section 24 of the New South Wales Act 
107Section 23 of the New South Wales Act 
108section 36 of the New South Wales Act and s 44 of the Victoria Act 
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XIV OTHER REFORM OPTIONS 
W Contracting Out 
This theory presumes the consent of the deceased to the removal of 
tissue unless the consent has been specifically withheld. The 
presumption of consent has its origin in the belief that it is necessary to 
save the lives of others and that it is otherwise "(R]easonable on the 
basis of the community altruism .... 11109 In its purest form the system 
will allow the removal of tissue unless the deceased has expressed an 
objection. 
In 1976 France enacted contracting out legislation. The law authorises 
the retention of a deceased's organs or tissues for therapeutic and 
scientific uses unless the deceased has objected to such a use.
11 0 
The family is not permitted to refuse when such refusal is based on their 
own objections. Specially exempted from the contracting out law are 
minors, the mentally disabled and other incompetents . However it is 
reported, 111 that it remains the practice of French doctors to obtain the 
consent of the next of kin . This is largely due to custom and the 
"(C]linical and psychological reality of sensitively dealing with bereaved 
families". 112 The difficulty in applying the strict contracting out 
legislation has been suggested as having "[H]ad little positive impact on 
organ scarcity" .113 
109Law Reform Commission of Canada Procurement and Transfer of Human Tissues 
and Organs (Canada Communication Group Publishing, Ottawa, 1992) 181 
110Loi number 76-1181 and see above n 109, 147 
111 Above n 17, 1167 and above n 109, 149 
112Above n 109, 149 
113Above n 109, 148 
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In contrast the contracting out legislation enacted in 1986 in Belgium has 
lead to a doubling of the number of organs recovered .114 The 
legislation is wider than the French law as it allows for the removal of 
tissue from minors. However, the Belgium law does reflect the French 
law in that the family may not object to the removal if the objection is 
based on their own views, rather than those of the deceased. 
Italy and Spain have enacted diluted contracting out legislation 11 5 that 
acknowledges the reality that close family members will often insist on 
some control over what happens to a deceased 's body . 
The Council of Europe (established after World War II to promote human 
rights) has sought to harmonise organ transplantation and tissue 
transfers between its member states . In 1987 it recommended a 
contracting out system, and reported that 13 of the 22 members states 
had adopted this approach to the removal of organs from cadavers .11 6 
The Council of Europe also acknowledged that the practice in most 
member states was to consult , to a greater or lesser extent, with 
members of the family before removal occurred.117 This view was 
confirmed in early 1993 with the statement: 11 8 
Legislation on post-mortem donation in Europe differs from country to 
country. Some apply the opting in system (explicit consent), others 
the opting out system (presumed consent) and there are also mixed 
114Law of 13 June 1986 on the Removal and Transplantation of Organs (Belgium), 
above n 109, 151 and see P Mitchielson "Organ Shortage - What to Do" (1992) 24 
Transplantation Proceedings 2391 
11 5Above n 22, 304 
116Above n 109, 152 
117 Above n 109, 153 
118H D c Roscam Abbing "Transplantation of Organs: A European Perspective" (1993) 
21 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 54 
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systems. Often relations are given a decisive voice, if not through the 
law, then in daily practice. 
In New Zealand, paragraph 4.1 (a) of the Code emphasis the desirability 
of the relatives being involved in the decision to remove an organ even 
when the deceased has requested removal. 
The extent to which the deceased's family is allowed to play a role in the 
removal decision may never be solved. It is unrealistic to ignore it and 
accordingly, necessary to incorporate a restrictive familial role in any 
contracting out legislation. Adoption of this approach would involve 
people who have a right to inform the doctor of the deceased's, or their 
own, objection to the removal of tissue. The first category is that of the 
spouse, or de facto spouse, living with the deceased at the time of 
death. If such a person exists then that spouse shall have the sole right 
of objection. In the absence of a spouse the doctor may receive an 
objection from the next category. The parents of the deceased would 
occupy the second category, if the objection was not unanimous the 
doctor could authorise the removal. If neither of the two classes existed 
or conveyed an objection, and in the absence of an objection from the 
deceased, removal could be authorised. A doctor would not be under 
any obligation to make any enquiries about the existence of the spouse 
and/or parents and whether or not any objection existed . While 
acknowledging that the two categories are arbitrary, it is noted that 
arbitrariness is often a hallmark of any legislative compromise . 
There remain two further policies on organ procurement. 
X Required Request 
Required request places hospital staff under a statutory obligation to ask 
the deceased's relatives for permission to remove organs. Required 
enquiry statutes embody a softer approach; they simply require a doctor 
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to inform the family of a potential donor of the opportunity to donate. 
Both approaches have been adopted by at least 44 states 11 9 in the 
United States. The approach reflects the view that organ donation 
should be encouraged by altruism and voluntarism. It is premised on 
the belief that doctors find it difficult, if not impossible, to approach 
grieving relatives to ask for permission to remove organs . Required 
request and enquiry compel the doctor to ask in the hope that the family 
will consent to the removal. However, a recent survey120 conducted 
in the United States concluded that the required request model was not 
increasing the available number of organs. The survey revealed that the 
failure of doctors to approach a family and ask for permission to 
remove, only accounted for 13.4% of lost donors . The major 
impediment to donation were the families who refused (50%) and the 
families that placed conditions on the donation (22.2%) .121 It was 
concluded that the two assumptions of required request; that doctors fai l 
to ask families and that if asked, the families would consent, were 
erroneous. 
The policy's apparent lack of success in the United States provides one 
reason for not adopting it as an organ procurement policy . 
Nonetheless, required request appears to add little to ss 3(1) and 3(2) 
of the Act, as the person in possession is already obliged to enquire into 
the existence of objections to the proposed removal. This process is 
essentially the same as requesting permission for the donation of 
organs; it is highly likely that if a person is given an opportunity to 
object, they will, if so inclined, consent. 
119Above n 109, 151 and the National Organ Transplant Act 1984, 42 uses 273, 274, 
1320B-8 
120L A Siminoff, R M Arnold , A L Caplan, B A Virnig and D L Seltzer "Public Policy 
Governing Organ and Tissue Procurement in the United States, Results from the 
National Organ and Tissue Procurement Study" (1995) 123 Ann Intern Med 10 
121Above n 120, 15 
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Y Compulsory Procurement 
Compulsory or routine procurement of organs regardless of the 
intentions of the deceased, or his or her family, has found little favour. 
It ignores the autonomy of the living potential donor and religious, 
cultural and familial beliefs and practices. The approach has, as its 
principal tenet the belief that the use of organs for the saving of life is 
paramount, and that no-one has the right to deny another the right to 
life. It draws a comparison with an autopsy in arguing that there already 
exists a statutory right to deal with a deceased in a manner contrary to 
the wishes of the deceased or the deceased's family. As laudable as 
the policy's ethical basis is, it is contrary to the current medico-legal 
environment that emphasises patient autonomy and consent to medical 
procedures. It is unlikely to be viewed as a workable alternative to the 
present policy of the Act. 
The reforms discussed all have the shared purpose of increasing the 
supply of organs. The exists a potential for an over supply; with this in 
mind it is necessary to consider the difficulties that may arise in the 
context of the storage of removed tissue. 
XV THE STORAGE AND USE OF EXCISED TISSUE 
The increasing using of tissue for bio-technological research and 
developments in the preservation of excised tissue prompt an 
examination into the rights and obligations that arise in these 
circumstances. 
The prospect of the preserved tissue remaining the property of the 
estate of the deceased is remote. The common law "no property 
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rule11122 in a cadaver would, almost certainly prevent, an estate claiming 
a proprietary interest in the unburied tissue. If a dead body cannot be 
the subject of ownership then, a fortiori, the tissue making up the body 
cannot be owned. 
The way various legislatures have dealt with the storage and use of 
reproductive tissue provides further evidence of a reluctance to attach 
full ownership rights to human tissue. The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (UK) and the Human Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Bill, (the Bill)123 do not vest ownership of human embryos 
and/or gametes in anyone. The Bill prohibits their storage and use by 
anyone that is not licenced by an authority established under the 
legislation.124 The authority is empowered to establish rules and 
procedures 125 regulating the storage and use based on the clause 3 
principles of dignity, the right of individual autonomy and the right to 
know one's genetic background . The principles do not include 
ownership. Further assistance can also be obtained from the English 
and Australian legislation126 that makes it an offence to sell or 
purchase human tissue. A similar prohibition appears in clause 9(d) of 
the Bill. While accepting that the prohibition does not directly address 
the issue of whether tissue can be owned127 it is likely that the 
legislature would not accept proprietary rights in cadaveric tissue . It 
122See text at n 4 - n 11 inclusive 
1231ntroduced to the New Zealand House of Representatives on 27 June 1996 
124See clause 11 of the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill. The name of 
the authority is the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Authortty 
125rhe draft rules and regulations are not yet available 
126Section 1 of the Human Organ Transplants Act 1989 (UK), the Human Tissue Act 
1983 (NSW), the Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) and s 27(1) and (2) of the Human 
Tissue Act 1985 (Tas) 
127 J w Harris "Who Owns My Body" (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 55, 75 
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must follow that if a living person cannot trade his or her tissue then 
neither can that person's Estate. 
The Supreme Court of California's decision in Moore v Regents of 
University of California128lends further support, albeit it in the context 
of a living person, for the proposition that the common law will not 
recognise proprietary rights in human tissue. The facts concerned the 
removal of Moore's spleen and the subsequent use of its cells. As a 
consequence of genetic engineering, the cells became a self developing 
"cell-line". By 1990 the cell-line was considered to be the basis of a 
three billion dollar industry. The Supreme Court of California reversed 
the finding (in the Court of Appeal's 129) that Moore had a property 
right in his tissue and that any unauthorised use of that tissue amounted 
to conversion. The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that no full 
property rights existed in human tissue and that the patient's right to be 
fully informed about the nature and consequences of an operation, 130 
would be protected by the imposition of a duty on the doctor to fully 
disclose the potential of, and the use of, the tissue.131 If the common 
law as a consequence of Moore is not prepared to recognise a right 
of full ownership in tissue removed from a living person then, a fortiori, 
it will not recognise the same right in tissue from a cadaver. This would 
be consistent with the no property rule . There are many problems 132 
with the Moore decision not the least of which is the potential for a 
128(1990) 271 Cal Rptr 146 
129(1988) 249 Cal Rptr 494 (Court of Appeals) 
1301n the decision this was defined as being a right to bodily privacy and the right 
against uninvited bodily invasion 
131 Above n 128, 150-154, 156-158, 160 and 163-164 
132Further exploration of the Moore decision is beyond the scope of this paper. For 
an analysis of the Court of Appeals' decision see P M Parker "Recognising Property 
Interests in Bodily tissue" (1989) 1 o Journal of Legal Medicine 357, and for a discussion 
of body ownership, and the Supreme Court decision in Moore see Harris above n 127 
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hospital to make considerable sums of money as a consequence of the 
use of another person's tissue. The fact that the University of California 
did not own Moore's spleen cells, still did not prevent it earning a 
significant amount of money from the cell-line. Given the uncertainty and 
undeveloped state of the common law in New Zealand and the 
development of legislation that excludes a full ownership interest in 
reproductive tissue, legislation should be enacted to define the status of 
retained tissue from cadavers and living donors. Any such legislation 
would: 
(i) Prohibit a proprietary interest in human tissue whether obtained 
from a living donor or a cadaver. 
(ii) Require the donor to give informed consent to the removal, 
storage and use of tissue . 
(iii) In the manner of the Human Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
Bill, create an authority to make rules to govern the storage and 
use of tissue. 
(iv) Stipulate that those who store and use the tissue would need to 
be licenced by the authority. 
(v) Provide for compensation to the donor and developer for any 
commercial success of the product developed from tissue. 
In his dissenting judgment in the Supreme Court of California, Broussard 
J stated : 133 
It is certainly arguable that , as a matter of policy or morality, it would 
be wiser to prohibit any private individual or entity from profiting from 
the fortuitous value that adheres in a part of a human body, and 
instead to require all valuable excised body parts to be deposited in 
a public repos~ory which would then make such materials freely 
available to all scientists for the betterment of society as a whole. 
133Above n 128, 172 
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An authority governing the use and storage of human tissue would give 
effect to the sentiments expressed by Broussard J. 
XVI CONCLUSION 
Section 3 has the effect of restricting the supply of human tissue for 
therapeutic purposes. This occurs because of the confused policy 
objectives of the section. The section fails to strike a balance between 
the supply of organs and the sanctity of a dead body. The generous 
rights of familial objection when combined with the emotional nature of 
cadaveric transplantation create a strong bias in favour of organ 
retention, not donation. Confused drafting manifests itself in a section 
that has poor structure and vague and largely undefinable terms. These 
problems are compounded by a lack of common law principles and 
advances in medical technology that have increased the demand for 
organs. 
Reform is needed, if only to clarify the meaning of s 3 within its existing 
hybrid policy. The preferable course is to enact new, contracting out 
legislation which emphasises the procurement of organs for the healing 
of the sick. Strong legislative guidance is required in an area that is 
clouded by emotion and death. 
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